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Abstract
In this paper we make a contribution to the unifi-
cation of formal models of defeasible reasoning. We
present several translations between formal argumenta-
tion frameworks and nonmonotonic logics for reasoning
with plausible assumptions. More specifically, we trans-
late adaptive logics into assumption-based argumenta-
tion and ASPIC+, ASPIC+ into assumption-based ar-
gumentation and a fragment of assumption-based ar-
gumentation into adaptive logics. Adaptive logics are
closely related to Makinson’s default assumptions and
to a significant class of systems within the tradition of
preferential semantics in the vein of KLM and Shoham.
Thus, our results also provide close links between for-
mal argumentation and the latter approaches.
1 Introduction
There is a a plenitude of logical approaches to the modelling
of defeasible reasoning known as nonmonotonic logics (in
short, NMLs). These approaches often use different meth-
ods, representational formats or key ideas, making it some-
times difficult to compare them, e.g. with respect to the con-
sequence relations they give rise to. Such comparisons are
important to systematise the field of NMLs and to gain in-
sights into which forms of defeasible reasoning are express-
ible in which formal frameworks. An important tool for such
comparisons are translations between systems of NML. If
one system (or a fragment thereof) is translatable into an-
other system we immediately know that the latter system is
at least as expressive as the former. Moreover, this may lead
to forms of cross-fertilisation, since meta-theoretic proper-
ties become transferable between the translated systems.
In this contribution we will investigate several such trans-
lations. Given the richness of the domain of NMLs, we ap-
proach the topic from a specific angle. Our focus will be
on structured argumentation, on the one hand, and NMLs
that model defeasible inferences in terms of strict inference
rules and defeasible assumptions, on the other hand. As a
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side product, the translation will also cover a significant sub-
class of NMLs in the KLM paradigm based on preferential
semantics [18, 12].
At least since Dung introduced abstract argumenta-
tion [8], formal argumentation has been an important
sub-domain of NML. While in abstract argumentation
arguments are not phrased in a formal language and the
underlying inferences are not explicated, several systems of
structured or instantiated formal argumentation have been
developed which overcome this limitation (cf. [5] for a
partial overview). In this paper we will focus on two of the
most prominent accounts: assumption-based argumentation
(in short, ABA) [7, 10, 20] and ASPIC+ [16, 14].
One of the key differences between several formal ap-
proaches to defeasible reasoning concerns the question of
how to model defeasible inferences. Let A1, . . . , An  B
denote the defeasible inference from A1, . . . , An to B. The
question is whether such an inference should be phrased
in terms of a strict inference rule or a defeasible one. A
strict inference rule allows for no exceptions: if its premises
A1, . . . , An are true, the consequent B is true as well. In
contrast, defeasible rules allow for exceptions, that is, un-
der specific circumstances it may hold that all premises
A1, . . . , An of the rule hold while the consequentB doesn’t.
Clearly, in the approach with strict rules defeasibility has to
enter in a different way. One way is by means of explicitly
stated defeasible assumptions As1, . . . ,Asm, i.e., specific
premises which are assumed to hold by default and which
can serve as antecedents of strict rules. An inference is re-
tracted in case there is a demonstration that one of the de-
feasible assumptions As1, . . . ,Asm doesn’t hold.
ABA follows the approach based on strict rules and defea-
sible assumptions. In ASPIC+ both approaches can be rep-
resented. Not surprisingly, ABA has been shown to be trans-
latable to ASPIC+ [16]. In this paper we will show the other
(perhaps more surprising) direction, namely that ASPIC+
(without priorities) can be translated into ABA and thus that
both frameworks are equi-expressive.
There are several nonmonotonic systems that model de-
feasible inference by means of strict rules. Among them
are adaptive logics (in short, ALs) [4], Makinsons’ default
assumptions and forms of circumscription. Makinson’s de-
fault assumptions –and in view of the translation in [22] also
ALs– are a generalisations of approaches based on maximal
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consistent subsets [17]. In view of [1] we know that there
are close connections between approaches based on maxi-
mal consistent subsets and structured argumentation. In this
paper the ties will be strengthened. We show that ALs can be
translated into ABA and ASPIC+ and present a translation
in the opposite direction for a subclass of ABA and ASPIC+.
We will proceed as follows: in Sections 2–5 we introduce
the basic systems (ALs, preferential semantics, default as-
sumptions, ABA, and ASPIC+). In Sections 6–8 we provide
translations as indicated in Figure 1.
2 Adaptive Logics
ALs are a general framework for the formal explication of
defeasible reasoning. It has been applied to a multitude of
defeasible reasoning forms (mainly related to questions from
philosophical logic), such as nonmonotonic forms of reason-
ing with inconsistent information, causal discovery, induc-
tive generalisations, abductive hypothesis generation, nor-
mative reasoning, etc. (see [19, p.86] for an overview).
The driving idea behind ALs is to apply defeasible in-
ference rules under explicit normality assumptions. More
specifically, given a compact Tarksi logic L (the core or
lower limit logic) in a formal languageL and with the deriv-
ability relation ⊢L, a set of abnormalities Ω ⊆ L is fixed.
Now, whenever the core logic gives rise to Γ ⊢L A ∨ ab
where ab ∈ Ω, A can be derived in the adaptive logic (based
on L and Ω) on the (defeasible) assumption that ab is false.1
In ALs this basic idea of modeling defeasible inferences
is implemented in Hilbert-style proofs. We will first explain
the proof theory of ALs.2 Then we give alternative character-
izations of the adaptive consequence relations that are cen-
tral to prove the adequacy of our translations in subsequent
sections.
In ALs, usual Hilbert-style proofs are adjusted in two ma-
jor ways. First, to keep track of normality assumptions, proof
lines in adaptive proofs are equipped with an additional col-
umn in which the abnormalities are listed that are assumed
to be false. Second, different retraction mechanisms for lines
1The disjunction ∨ is supposed to be classical. In fact, in the
standard format of ALs which we consider here, the core logic is
supposed to be supraclassical. Whenever non-classical logics are
used as core logics, classical negation ¬ and classical disjunction
∨ are superimposed.
2Due to spatial restrictions we will focus on the main ideas but
explain some aspects of the proof theory (such as adaptive strate-
gies) merely in a semi-formal way. For a more thorough explana-
tion the interested reader is referred to [4, 19].
with abnormality assumptions that turn out mistaken are im-
plemented in terms of so-called adaptive strategies. We will
give some examples below.
To further explain how adaptive proofs work, it is useful to
turn to a concrete example. As an illustration, we take a look
at inconsistency-ALs. These are based on paraconsistent
core logics such as LP or CLuN(s)3. These core logics typ-
ically do not validate disjunctive syllogism A,∼A ∨B ⊢ B
since in case A is involved in a contradiction, B would not
follow (then∼A would suffice for the disjunction∼A∨B to
be true). Nevertheless, inconsistency-ALs allow for the de-
feasible application of disjunctive syllogism under the nor-
mality assumption that there is no contradiction in A. Hence,
in inconsistency ALs the abnormalities in Ω typically have
the form of a contradiction A ∧ ∼A. E.g., in paraconsistent
core logics it usually holds that A,∼A∨B ⊢ B∨ (A∧∼A)
and thus one can defeasibly derive B under the assumption
that there is no contradiction in A. Clearly, sometimes such
assumptions turn out to be mistaken in view of the given
premises. Obviously, this is the case if A ∧ ∼A is derivable
from the given premises. A more interesting case is given, if
A∧∼A is not directly derivable but it is derivable as a mem-
ber of a minimal disjunction of abnormalities. We illustrate
this in the following example.
Example 1. Suppose our core logic is a standard
paraconsistent logic such as LP or CLuN(s). Let
Γ = {∼p,∼q, p ∨ q, p ∨ r, q ∨ s}.
1 ∼p PREM ∅
2 ∼q PREM ∅
3 p ∨ r PREM ∅
4 q ∨ s PREM ∅
5 p ∨ q PREM ∅
6 r ∨ (p ∧ ∼p) 1,3,L-Inf ∅
7 s ∨ (q ∧ ∼q) 2,4,L-Inf ∅
8 r 6,RC {p ∧ ∼p}
9 s 7,RC {q ∧∼q}
10 r ∨ s 8,L-Inf {p ∧ ∼p}
11 r ∨ s 9,L-Inf {q ∧∼q}
12 (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q) 1,2,5,L-Inf ∅
Each proof line has 4 elements: a line number, a formula,
a justification and a set of abnormalities (which are assumed
to be false). All inferences of the core logic L can be applied
(indicated by L-Inf in lines 6, 10, 11 and 12). In lines 8 and
9 defeasible inferences are made as explained above. E.g.,
since at line 6 r∨(p∧∼p) is derived, at line 8 the abnormal-
ity p∧∼p is considered false and thus put in the abnormality
column. The rule employed for this is called RC (rule condi-
tional): from (l;A ∨ ab; ∆) derive (l′;A; l, RC; ∆ ∪ {ab}).
When further inferences are made calling upon lines with
non-empty sets of abnormalities, these abnormalities are
carried over (see lines 10 and 11 where the abnormalities
of lines 8 and 9 are carried over).
The retraction of lines in adaptive proofs is always deter-
mined in view of the minimal disjunctions of abnormalities
derived at a given stage of a proof (on the empty set of ab-
normalities). At line 12 such a minimal disjunction of ab-
3CLuN(s) is positive classical logic enriched by the law of the
excluded middle. For an axiomatization and a semantics see [3].
normalities is derived. Clearly, the abnormalities assumed to
be false at lines 8–11 are involved in the given disjunction.
There are different retraction mechanisms for ALs: so-called
adaptive strategies. According to the reliability strategy, any
line with an abnormality in the assumption that is part of a
minimal disjunction of abnormalities is to be retracted. Re-
traction is implemented by marking lines that are retracted.
In this case:
X 8 r 6,RC {p ∧ ∼p}
X 9 s 7,RC {q ∧∼q}
X 10 r ∨ s 8,L-Inf {p ∧ ∼p}
X 11 r ∨ s 9,L-Inf {q ∧∼q}
There are other, less cautious, strategies. For instance, ac-
cording to the minimal abnormality strategy, r ∨ s will not
be retracted. The reason is as follows. If we interpret our
premises strictly as normal as possible, then in view of line
12 it will be the case that either p ∧ ∼p holds (and q ∧ ∼q
doesn’t), or q∧∼q holds (and p∧∼p doesn’t). In each case,
one of the assumptions of line 10 or 11 is warranted. Due to
space limitations, we omit the technical details. Yet another
strategy is normal selections. According to it a line with the
set of abnormalities ∆ is retracted (or marked) once ∨∆ is
derived on the empty condition.
These retraction mechanisms provided by adaptive strate-
gies make AL proofs dynamic: sometimes a line may get
marked, later unmarked, and yet later marked again. In or-
der to define a consequence relation we need a stable notion
of derivability. It works as follows: a formula at a line l of
a proof is finally derived at a stage of the proof if l is not
marked and every extension of the proof in which it gets
marked can be further extended such that it is unmarked
again. The consequence relation of ALs is the defined as
follows:
Definition 1. Let L be a compact Tarski logic in the formal
language L, let Ω ⊆ L be a set of abnormalities, and let
str ∈ {r,ma, ns} be an adaptive strategy (reliability, mini-
mal abnormality, or normal selections). WhereΓ∪{A} ⊆ L,
Γ ⊢Ω,Lstr A iff A is finally derivable in an adaptive proof from
Γ.
For our translations alternative characterisations of the
consequence relations defined in terms of final derivability
in Definition 1 will be very useful. These characterisations
are essentially informed by the set of minimal disjunctions
of abnormalities derivable from a given premise set by the
core logic L.
Definition 2. Where Γ ⊆ L: ΣL(Γ) is the set of all non-
empty ∆ ⊆ Ω such that Γ ⊢L
∨
∆ and for all non-empty
∆′ ⊂ ∆, Γ 0L
∨
∆′.
A choice set over ΣL(Γ) is a set Θ for which ∆ ∩Θ 6= ∅
for all ∆ ∈ ΣL(Γ).
Definition 3. Where Γ ⊆ L: ΦL(Γ) is the set of ⊂-minimal
choice sets over ΣL(Γ).
The following facts will be useful in what follows:
Fact 1 ([19]). 1. For all choice sets Θ over ΣL(Γ) there is
a Θ′ ∈ ΦL(Γ) such that Θ′ ⊆ Θ.
2. φ ∈ ΦL(Γ) iff φ is a choice set of ΣL(Γ) and for all
A ∈ φ there is a ∆A ∈ ΣL(Γ) for which {A} = ∆A ∩ φ.
We now give representation theorems for all three adap-
tive strategies, a given core logic L and a given set of abnor-
malities Ω.
Theorem 1 ([4]). Γ ⊢Ω,L
ma
A iff for all Θ ∈ ΦL(Γ) there is a
∆ ⊆ Ω \Θ such that Γ ⊢L A ∨
∨
∆.
Theorem 2 ([4]). Γ ⊢Ω,L
r
A iff there is a ∆ ⊆ Ω \⋃ΣL(Γ)
such that Γ ⊢L A ∨
∨
∆.
Theorem 3 ([4]). Γ ⊢Ω,L
ns
A iff there is a Θ ∈ ΦL(Γ) and a
∆ ⊆ Ω \Θ such that Γ ⊢L A ∨
∨
∆.
3 Preferential Semantics and Default
Assumptions
The semantics for ALs are a special but rich subclass of the
well known preferential semantics as defined in [12] and
[18]. As in the previous section we assume a core logic L
in a formal language L and a set of abnormalities Ω ⊆ L.
We also assume that the core logic L comes with an ade-
quate model-theoretic semantics and an associated semantic
consequence relation L. We write M(Γ) for the set of all
models of a premise set Γ. Furthermore, where M ∈M(Γ),
Ab(M) = {A ∈ Ω | M |= A}. A model M ∈ M(Γ) is
minimally abnormal iff there is no M ′ ∈ M(Γ) for which
Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 4. • Γ Ω,Lma A iff M |= A for every minimally
abnormal model of Γ.
• Γ Ω,L
r
A iff M |= A for every M ∈ M(Γ) for which
all A ∈ Ab(M) are verified in some minimally abnormal
model M ′ ∈ M(Γ).
• Γ Ω,Lns A iff there is a minimally abnormal model M ∈
M(Γ) such that for all M ′ ∈M(Γ) for which Ab(M) =
Ab(M ′), M ′ |= A.
ALs in the standard format are sound and complete w.r.t.
these semantics (proven e.g. in [4]):
Theorem 4. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L and str ∈ {ma, r, ns},
Γ Ω,Lstr A iff Γ ⊢Ω,Lstr A.
In [22], the connection between ALs and Makinson’s De-
fault Assumption Consequence Relations (in short, DACRs)
[13, chapter 2] was established. In [13, chapter 2], it is also
shown that many other non-monotonic consequence rela-
tions, such as Reiter’s Closed World Assumption, Poole’s
Background Constraints, etc. can be expressed as DACRs.
DACRs give formal substance to the idea that, in many sit-
uations, non-monotonic reasoning makes use of a set ∆ of
defeasible background assumptions in combination with the
strict and explicit premises in Γ. These background assump-
tions are used to the extent that they are consistent with Γ.
Accordingly, DACRs make use of the notion of maximal
consistent subset:
Definition 5. Where Γ ∪ ∆ ⊆ L, Θ ⊆ ∆ is a maximal
Γ-consistent subset of ∆ iff:
• Γ ∪Θ 6⊢L A for some A ∈ L and
• Γ ∪Θ′ ⊢L A for all A ∈ L and for every Θ ⊂ Θ′ ⊆ ∆.
MCS(Γ,∆) is the set of all maximal Γ-consistent subsets of
∆.
Definition 6. Where Γ ∪∆ ∪ {A} ⊆ L, Γ ⊢DA,L∆ A iff for
every ∆′ ∈ MCS(Γ,∆), Γ ∪∆′ ⊢L A.
The connection between adaptive logic and DACR’s is the
following:
Theorem 5. [22, p.10] Where Γ∪∆∪{A} ⊆ L and ∆¬ =
{¬B | B ∈ ∆}, Γ ⊢DA,L∆ A iff Γ ⊢∆
¬,L
ma
A.
4 Assumption-Based Argumentation
ABA, thoroughly described in [7], is a formal model that al-
lows one to use a set of plausible assumptions “to extend a
given theory” [7, p.70] unless and until there are good argu-
ments for not using such an assumption.
Inferences are implemented in ABA by means of a deduc-
tive system consisting of a language and rules formulated
over this language:
Definition 7 (Deductive System). A deductive system is a
pair (L,R) such that
• L is a formal language (consisting of countably many sen-
tences).
• R is a set of inference rules of the form A1, . . . , An → A
and → A, where A,A1 . . . , An ∈ L
Definition 8. AnR-deduction from a theory Γ is a sequence
B1, . . . , Bm, where m > 0 such that for all i = 1, . . . ,m:
Bi ∈ Γ or there exists a A1, . . . , An → Bi ∈ R such that
A1, . . . , An ∈ {B1, . . . , Bi−1}.
Definition 9. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L, Γ ⊢R A holds if there
is an R-deduction from Γ whose last element is A.
We now introduce defeasible assumptions and a contrari-
ness operator to express argumentative attacks. Given a rule
system, an assumption-based framework is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 10 (Assumption-based framework). An
assumption-based framework is a tuple ABF =
((L,R),Γ, Ab, ) where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system
• Γ ⊆ L
• ∅ 6= Ab ⊆ L is the set of candidate assumptions.
• : Ab→ L is a contrariness operator.4
In most structured accounts of argumentation attacks are
defined between arguments which are deductions in a given
deductive or defeasible system (e.g., in ASPIC+, Defeasi-
ble Logic Programming [11]) or sequents Γ ⊢L A where L
is an underlying core logic ([2, 6]).5 In contrast, ABA op-
erates at a higher level of abstraction, since attacks are de-
fined directly on the level of sets of assumptions instead of
on the level of R-deductions.6 ABA can thus be viewed as
4Note that does not denote the set theoretic complement.
5The former are sometimes referred to as rule-based and the
latter as logic-based systems of argumentation.
6Some formulations of ABA define attacks on the level of in-
dividual arguments. However, since attacks are only possible ‘on’
assumptions, these formulations are equivalent (cf. also [20]).
operating on the level of equivalence classes consisting of
arguments generated using the same assumptions.
Definition 11 (Attacks). Given an assumption-based frame-
work ABF = ((L,R),Γ, Ab, ):
• a set of assumptions ∆ ⊆ Ab attacks an assumption A ∈
Ab iff Γ ∪∆ ⊢R A.
• a set of assumptions ∆ ⊆ Ab attacks a set of assumptions
∆′ ⊆ Ab iff Γ ∪∆ ⊢R A for some A ∈ ∆′.
Consequences of a given assumption-based framework
are determined with the use of argumentation semantics.
On the basis of argumentative attacks, semantics determine
sets of assumptions that are acceptable given different cri-
teria of acceptability, such as the requirement that a given
set of assumption should not attack itself, or it should be
able to defend itself against attacks by other sets of assump-
tions. Argumentation semantics have been phrased for ab-
stract frameworks in [8] and have been generalised to the
level of ABA in e.g. [7].
Definition 12 (Argumentation semantics). Where ∆ ⊆ Ab:
• ∆ is closed iff ∆ = {A ∈ Ab | Γ ∪∆ ⊢R A}.
• ∆ is conflict-free iff for every A ∈ Ab,∆ ∪ Γ 6⊢R A or
∆ ∪ Γ 6⊢R A.
• A closed set ∆ is naive iff it is maximally (w.r.t. set inclu-
sion) conflict-free.
• A closed set of assumptions ∆ ⊆ Ab is admissible iff it is
conflict-free and for each closed set of assumptions ∆′ ⊆
Ab, if ∆′ attacks ∆, then ∆ attacks ∆′.
• A set ∆ is preferred iff it is maximally (w.r.t. set inclusion)
admissible.
• ∆ is stable iff it is closed, conflict-free and attacks every
a ∈ Ab \∆.
We write niv(ABF), prf(ABF) resp. stb(ABF) for the set
of naive, preferred resp. stable sets of assumptions in ABF.
Example 2. Let Ab = {q,¬p ∨ ¬q}, Γ = {p}, let the rule
system R characterize classical logic and A = ¬A (where
¬ is classical negation). Then there are two preferred sets:
{¬p∨¬q}, {q}. To see this note that e.g. Γ∪{¬p∨¬q} ⊢R
¬q and Γ ∪ {q} ⊢R ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q).
We are now in a position to define various consequence
relations for ABA:
Definition 13. Given an assumption-based framework
ABF = ((L,R),Γ, Ab, ) and sem ∈ {niv, prf, stb}:
• ABF ⊢∪
sem
A iff Γ∪∆ ⊢R A for some ∆ ∈ sem(ABF).
• ABF ⊢∩sem A iff Γ∪∆ ⊢R A for every ∆ ∈ sem(ABF).
• ABF ⊢⋓sem A iff Γ ∪
⋂
{∆ | ∆ ∈ sem} ⊢R A.
5 ASPIC+
In ASPIC+, as in ABA, inferences made on the basis of a
strict knowledge base can be extended with additional infer-
ences based on plausible assumptions. However, whereas in
ABA attacks and extensions where defined directly on the
level of these assumptions, in ASPIC+, arguments are spe-
cific deductions. More precisely, arguments are constructed
from a knowledge base using an argumentation system. An
argumentation system is a generalisation of a deductive sys-
tem (Def. 7) that allows for a distinction between strict (i.e.
deductive or safe) and defeasible rules.7
Definition 14 (Defeasible Theory). Given a formal lan-
guage L, a defeasible theory R = (L,S,D) consists of
(where A1, . . . , An, B ∈ L):
• a set of strict rules S of the form A1, . . . , An → B
• a set of defeasible rules D of the form A1, . . . , An ⇒ B.
We also assume there is a naming function N : S ∪ D →
L s.t. every rule r ∈ S ∪ D gets assigned a unique name.
A1, . . . , An are called the antecedents and B is called the
consequent of A1, . . . , An → B resp. A1, . . . , An ⇒ B.
Definition 15 (Argumentation System). Given a defeasible
theory R, an argumentation system is a tuple AS = (R, )
where is a contrariness function from L to 2L.
Arguments are built by using defeasible and/or strict rules
to derive conclusions from a knowledge base. A knowledge
base consists of strict and plausible premises. Kn is the set
of all (necessary) axioms, i.e. premises that are considered
to be outside the reach of argumentative attacks. Ka has an
analogous function to the defeasible assumptions in ABA:
they are deemed plausible in that they are assumed to be
true unless and until a counterargument is encountered.
Definition 16 (Knowledge Base). A Knowledge Base is a
set K, where K = Kn ∪Ka and Kn ∩ Ka = ∅.
Definition 17 (Arguments). Let AS = (R, ) be an argu-
mentation system and K = Ka ∪ Kn a knowledge base. An
argument a is one of the following:
• a premise argument 〈A〉 if A ∈ K
• a strict rule-argument 〈a1, . . . an 7→ B〉 if a1, . . . an (with
n > 0) are arguments such that there exists a strict rule
conc(a1), . . . conc(an)→ B ∈ S.
• a defeasible rule-argument 〈a1, . . . an ⇛ B〉 if a1, . . . an
(with n > 0) are arguments such that there exists a defea-
sible rule conc(a1), . . . conc(an)⇒ B.
We will useArg(AS,K) to denote the set of all arguments
that can be built from a knowledge base K using an argu-
mentation system AS.
Example 3. Let S = {¬q → ¬p}, D = {¬p ⇒ s}, Kn =
{¬s}, and Ka = {¬q,¬p, q}. We have, e.g., the following
arguments:
a1 = 〈¬q〉 a4 = 〈a3 ⇛ s〉 a7 = 〈¬s〉
a2 = 〈¬p〉 a5 = 〈a2 ⇛ s〉
a3 = 〈a1 7→ ¬p〉 a6 = 〈q〉
7In the ASPIC+ framework of [16], there is also the possibil-
ity to add a preference ordering over the premises and/or defea-
sible rules. Similar generalisations exist for ALs and approaches
based on maximal consistent subsets and their generalisations such
as Makinsons’ default assumptions. We will present investigations
into translations for systems with priorities at a future occasion. In
our presentation, we also disregard a special type of premise called
‘issue’ in the context of ASPIC+. Issues are premises that are never
acceptable in the sense that they always require further backup by
additional arguments.
Definition 18. Where a is an argument a = 〈B〉, a =
〈a1, . . . an 7→ B〉 or a = 〈a1, . . . an ⇛ B〉, we define:
• conc(a) = B
• sub(a) = sub(a1) ∪ . . . ∪ sub(an) ∪ {a}
• where a is a premise argument: prem(a) = {A}
• where a is not a premise argument: prem(a) =
{prem(a′) | a′ ∈ sub(a)}.
The distinction between strict and defeasible rule-
arguments allows us to define a variety of attack forms:
Definition 19 (Attacks). Where a, b ∈ Arg(AS,K), a at-
tacks b (in signs, a b) iff
• conc(a) ∈ B for someB ∈ prem(b)∩Ka (Undermining).
• conc(a) ∈ B′ for some b′ ∈ sub(b) such that conc(b′) =
B′ and b′ is of the form 〈b′1, . . . , b′n ⇛ B′〉 (Rebut).
• conc(a) = b′ for some b′ ∈ sub(b) such that b′ is a defea-
sible argument (Undercut).
Example 4 (Ex. 1, contd). Where A = {B | B ≡ ¬A}
for every A ∈ L, we have: a1  a6, a6  a1, a6  a3,
a6  a4, a7  a4, a7  a5.
Definition 20 (Structured Argumentation Frame-
work). A structured argumentation framework
AT = (Arg(AS,K), ) is a pair where Arg(AS,K)
is the set of arguments built from K using the argumentation
system AS and is an attack relation over Arg(AS,K).
Given a structured argumentation framework, we can
again make use of Dung’s argumentation semantics to de-
fine different notions of acceptable sets of arguments.
Definition 21 (Argumentation Semantics). Given a struc-
tured argumentation framework AT = (Arg(AS,K), ),
where B ⊆ Arg(AS,K),
• B is conflict-free iff there is no a, b ∈ B such that a b
• B is naive iff it is maximally conflict-free.
• B defends a ∈ A iff for every c ∈ A for which c  a,
there is a b ∈ B such that b c.
• B is admissible iff it is conflict-free and it defends every
argument a ∈ B
• B is preferred iff it is maximally (w.r.t. set inclusion) ad-
missible.
• B is stable iff it is conflict-free and for every a ∈
Arg(AS,K) \ B, B  a.
We write niv(AT), prf(AT) resp. stb(AT) for the set of
naive, preferred resp. stable sets of arguments in AT.
Definition 22. Where AT = (Arg(AS,K), ) is a struc-
tured argumentation framework and sem ∈ {niv, prf, stb},
• AT ⊢∪
sem
A iff there is an a ∈ B with conc(a) = A for
some B ∈ sem(AT).
• AT ⊢∩sem A iff for every B ∈ sem(AT) there is an a ∈ B
with conc(a) = A.
• AT ⊢⋓sem A iff there is an a ∈ B with conc(a) = A for
every B ∈ sem(AT).
6 Translating Adaptive Logic to
Assumption-Based Argumentation
The idea of the translation from ALs to ABA is the follow-
ing. We translate the lower limit logic L of the given AL
into a deductive system, plausible assumptions are negations
of abnormalities, and the contrariness operator is classical
negation. Recall that the lower limit logic is a supraclassical
Tarski logic. Hence, there are classical negation ¬ and clas-
sical disjunction ∨ in the underlying language of L. In the
remainder of this section we will use ¬ and ∨ denoting these
classical connectives.
We now go through the technical details of our translation.
Definition 23. Let AL be an AL with the lower limit logic
L in a formal language L and the consequence relation ⊢L,
the set of abnormalities Ω ⊆ L and a strategy str (relia-
bility, minimal abnormality, or normal selections). Let L be
characterised by the rules in R and the axiom schemes in A.
We the define the assumption based framework ABFΩL(Γ)
for the premise set Γ ⊆ L as the tuple ABFΩL(Γ) =
((L,R(L)),Γ, AbΩ, ) where:
• R(L) contains all instances of rules in R and a rule→ A
for all instances A of axiom schemes in A;8
• AbΩ = {¬A | A ∈ Ω}
• : AbΩ → L, where ¬A = A
Below we show the following representational theorem:
Theorem 6. Where Γ∪{A} ⊆ L and sem ∈ {niv, prf, stb},
1. ABFΩ
L
(Γ) ⊢∪
sem
A iff Γ ⊢Ω,L
ns
A
2. ABFΩL(Γ) ⊢∩sem A iff Γ ⊢Ω,Lma A
3. ABFΩ
L
(Γ) ⊢⋓
sem
A iff Γ ⊢Ω,L
r
A.
To avoid clutter we introduce some notational convention:
Notation 1. Where ∆ ⊆ Ω, ∆¬ = {¬A | A ∈ ∆} and
∆¬ = ∆.
The following fact follows immediately in view of the
compactness and the transitivity of L.
Fact 2. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L, Γ ⊢R(L) A iff Γ ⊢L A.
In view of this fact, we will indiscriminately use ⊢ as
⊢R(L) and ⊢L. Note that in view of the supraclassicality of
L we have:
Fact 3. Γ ∪∆¬ ⊢ A iff Γ ⊢ ∨∆¬ ∨ A.
We now established that every instantiation of an AL is
indeed an assumption-based framework. We prove that the
three consequence relations of ALs correspond to intuitive
ways of calculating consequences in ABA. The crucial re-
sult to prove this is the fact that every preferred extension
in some assumption-based framework ABFΩL(Γ) is exactly
the set of negations of abnormalities excluding some choice
set over the derivable abnormalities. This is shown in the
following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Where φ ∈ ΦL(Γ), AbΩ \ φ¬ is stable in
ABF
Ω
L(Γ).
8If no axiomatisation of L is given, we can proceed more brute
force and set R = {A1, . . . , An → A | {A1, . . . , An} ⊢L A}.
Proof. We first show that ∆¬ = AbΩ \ φ¬ is conflict-free.
Assume for a contradiction that it is not and hence that there
is a B ∈ Ω for which Γ∪∆¬ ⊢ B,¬B. Hence, by the com-
pactness of L and Fact 3, Γ ⊢
∨
Θ for some finite Θ ⊆ ∆.
Let Θ be⊂-minimal with this property. Hence, Θ ∈ ΣL(Γ).
However, then φ ∩Θ 6= ∅, a contradiction.
We now show that ∆¬ is stable. For this, let ¬B ∈ AbΩ \
∆¬. Hence, B ∈ φ. With Fact 1.2, there is a Θ ∈ ΣL(Γ)
such that {B} = φ ∩ Θ. Since Γ ⊢
∨
Θ, by Fact 3 also
Γ∪ (Θ¬ \ {¬B}) ⊢ B. By the monotonicity of L, Γ∪∆¬ ⊢
B which means that ∆ attacks B.
Since∆¬ is conflict-free and attacks everyA ∈ AbΩ\∆¬,
it is easy to see that ∆¬ is closed and stable.
Example 5 (Ex. 1 contd). Take AbΩ = {¬(A ∧ ∼A) | A ∈
LCLuN} andR an adequate rule system for CLuN. Where
Γ = {∼p,∼q, p ∨ q, p ∨ r, q ∨ s}. There are two stable
extensions: AbΩ \{¬(p∧∼p)} and AbΩ \{¬(q∧∼q))}. To
see this observe that e.g. Γ ∪ {¬(q ∧ ∼q)} ⊢CLuN p ∧ ∼p.
Lemma 2. If ∆¬ ⊆ AbΩ is conflict-free in ABFΩL(Γ) then
there is a φ ∈ ΦL(Γ) for which ∆ ⊆ Ω \ φ.
Proof. Suppose ∆ 6⊆ Ω \ φ for all φ ∈ ΦL(Γ) and ∆ ⊆ Ω.
By Fact 1, Ω \ ∆ is not a choice set of ΣL(Γ). Thus, there
is a Θ ∈ ΣL(Γ) for which Θ ⊆ ∆. Since Γ ⊢
∨
Θ, also
Γ ∪ (Θ \ {A}) ⊢ ¬A for any A ∈ Θ. Thus, Γ ∪ ∆ is not
L-consistent since Γ∪∆ ⊢ A,¬A by monotonicity. By Fact
2, Γ ∪ ∆ ⊢R(L) A,¬A and thus, ∆ is not conflict-free in
ABF
Ω
L
(Γ).
With Lemmas 1 and 2 we immediately get:
Lemma 3. Where Γ ⊆ L, {AbΩ \ φ¬ | φ ∈ ΦL(Γ)} =
stb(ABFΩL(Γ)) = prf(ABF
Ω
L(Γ)) = niv(ABF
Ω
L(Γ))
We are now in a position to prove our main result in this
section:
Proof of Theorem 6. In view of Lemma 3 it is enough to
show the theorem for sem = stb.
Ad 3. ABFΩL(Γ) ⊢⋓stb A iff Γ ∪
⋂
{∆ | ∆ ∈
stb(ABFΩL(Γ))} ⊢ A. By Lemma 1, this is the case
iff Γ ∪
⋂
{(Ω \ φ)¬ | φ ∈ ΦL(Γ)} ⊢ A. Since⋃
ΦL(Γ) =
⋃
ΣL(Γ) (which is easy to see and left
to the reader), this is equivalent to Γ∪ (Ω\⋃ΣL(Γ))¬ ⊢ A.
By compactness, monotonicity and Fact 3, this is equivalent
to Γ ⊢ A ∨
∨
∆ for some finite ∆ ⊆ Ω \
⋃
ΣL(Γ). By
Theorem 2 this is equivalent to Γ ⊢Ω,Lr A.
Ad 1. and 2. Analogous.
Translating Adaptive Logic to ASPIC+
In [16] we have a translation from ABA to ASPIC+. Al-
though this translation requires several assumptions that
ABF
Ω
L
(Γ) does not satisfy, it turns out that it is easy
to prove that any ABFΩ
L
(Γ) can easily be translated to
an assumption-based framework that does satisfy these as-
sumptions.
The underlying idea is basically the same as that for trans-
lating AL into ABA: the plausible knowledge base con-
sists of the negated abnormalities, the strict premises of the
ASPIC+ framework are the premise set Γ and the strict rules
of the ASPIC+ framework are the inference rules of the
monotonic core logic. Due to spatial restrictions, we are not
able to present the full technical details of this translation
and the adequacy results here.
7 Translating ASPIC+ to Assumption-Based
Argumentation
In this section we translate ASPIC+ to ABA. Since in ABA
we have no defeasible rules and less attack types than in
ASPIC+ the possibility of this translation is less expected
than the translation in the other direction (as provided in
[16]). In this section we thus offer an answer to the open
question stated in [14] whether such a translation can be
given. Our translation works as follows:
Definition 24. Where AS = (R, ) is an argumentation
system in the formal language L with a naming function
N for the rules in R and K = Kn ∪ Ka is a knowledge
base, we translate AS into an assumption-based framework
ABF(AS) = ((L′,R),Kn, Ab, ) as follows9
• L′ ⊇ L is such that L′ \ L contains for each r in R a
unique name n(r) and its contrary n(r);10
• R contains each strict rule from R and for each defeasible
rule r : A1, . . . , An ⇒ A it contains11
– the rule n(r), A1, . . . , An → A
– the rule A→ n(r)
• Ab = Ka ∪ {n(r) | r is a defeasible rule in R}
Below we will show that the translation is adequate in
view of the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Where AT = (Arg(AS,K), ) is a struc-
tured argumentation framework and sem ∈ {stb, prf},
1. ABF(AS) ⊢∪
sem
A iff AT ⊢∪
sem
A
2. ABF(AS) ⊢∩
sem
A iff AT ⊢∩
sem
A.
3. ABF(AS) ⊢⋓
sem
A iff AT ⊢⋓
sem
A.
In the following we suppose a given argumentation sys-
tem AS and its translation ABF(AS) as in Definition 24.
Definition 25. Where ∆ ⊆ Ab, Arg∆ ⊆ Arg(AS,K) is the
set of all arguments a that use only defeasible assumptions
in ∆, any strict rules, and only defeasible rules r for which
n(r) ∈ ∆.
WhereA ⊆ Arg(AS,K) is a set of arguments,AbA ⊆ Ab
is the set of assumptions consisting of (1) defeasible assump-
tions A ∈ Ka for which prem(a) = A or conc(a) = A for
9For simplicity, we will assume that the contrariness func-
tion of the ASPIC+-framework assigns a unique contrary to ev-
ery A ∈ L. If this assumption is not satisfied, one has to add
Ac1 → −A, . . . , A
c
n → −A for every Aci ∈ A¯, where−A ∈ L′\L
is the contrary of A in ABA, as suggested by [20, p.109].
10Formally: L′ \ L = {n(r) | r in R} ∪ {n(r) | r in R} (where
{n(r) | r in R} ∩ {n(r) | r in R} = ∅). This warrants that, unlike
the names N(r) ∈ L used in AS, the new names n(r) are not
antecedents and consequents of rules in R. We use the new names
to ’simulate’ defeasible rules in ABA.
11We suppose that the rules in R are instances as opposed to
schemes. The translation can easily be adjusted to schemes.
some a ∈ A and (2) of n(r) where r is a defeasible rule
used in some argument in A.
WhereA is a set of arguments in Arg(AS,K),A⋆ denotes
the set ArgAbA .
We sometimes write Aba instead of Ab{a}.
Fact 4. Where A ⊆ Arg(AS,K) is a set of assumptions,
A ⊆ A⋆.
Lemma 4. Where A 6= n(r) for any r in R and ∆ ⊆ Ab, if
Kn ∪∆ ⊢R A then
1. if A ∈ L, there is an a ∈ Arg∆ such that conc(a) = A,
2. else (if A = n(r)), there is an a ∈ Arg∆ for which
conc(a) = B where B is the consequent of r.
Proof. This can be shown by an induction on the length of a
deduction from Kn ∪∆ to A. Base step: this is trivial since
A ∈ K. Inductive step. We have three possibilities:
1. A is the result of applying a strict rule r in R to
A1, . . . , An, or
2. A is the result of applying the translation of a defeasible
rule r = A1, . . . , An ⇒ A ∈ R to A1, . . . , An and the
rule name n(r), or
3. A = n(r) is the result of applying a rule B → n(r)
where B is the consequent of the defeasible rule r in R.
Ad 2. By the induction hypothesis there are arguments ai
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. ai ∈ Arg∆ and conc(ai) = Ai. (Note here
that Ai /∈ L′ \ L.) Clearly, a = 〈a1, . . . , an ⇛ A〉 ∈ Arg∆
since n(r) ∈ ∆. Ad 1. Analogous. Ad 3. By the induction
hypothesis and since B ∈ L, there is an argument a ∈ Arg∆
with conc(a) = B.
The other direction of Lemma 4.1 follows immediately in
view of Definition 25:
Fact 5. Where A ⊆ Arg(AS,K), if there is an a ∈ A with
conc(a) = A then Kn ∪ AbA ⊢R A.
Lemma 5. WhereA ⊆ Arg(AS,K), ifA is admissible then
A⋆ is admissible.
Proof. Suppose there are a and b ∈ A⋆ s.t. a attacks b.
For each attack form it is easy to see that then there is a
b′′ ∈ A s.t. a attacks b′′. Take, for instance, rebuttal. Then
conc(a) = B
′
where B′ = conc(b′) for some b′ ∈ sub(b).
Hence, there is a defeasible rule r which is applied in b′ to
produce B′. By the definition of ArgAbA there is an argu-
ment b′′ ∈ A s.t. r is applied to produce conc(b′′) = B′.
For the other attack types (undercuts and undermines) this
is shown in an analogous way. Now, since A is admissi-
ble, there is a c ∈ A s.t. c attacks a. Since by Fact 4,
c ∈ A⋆, also A⋆ is defended. To show that A⋆ is conflict-
free, assume for a contradiction that a ∈ A⋆. Since a at-
tacks b′′ ∈ A, A attacks a (due to the admissibility of A).
However, in view of the fact that A and A⋆ make use of the
same defeasible assumptions and defeasible rules and A at-
tacks a in one of the two, this leads to a selfattack in some
argument a′ ∈ A. E.g., suppose A undermines a in some
B ∈ prem(a). Then B ∈ AbA. Hence there is an argument
a′ ∈ A with B ∈ prem(a′) and A attacks a′. Since A is
conflict-free, this is a contradiction.
Lemma 6. Where A = A⋆ ⊆ Arg(AS,K), AbA is closed.
Proof. Suppose A = A⋆ and Kn ∪ AbA ⊢R A for some
A ∈ Ab. We have two possibilities: (1) A = n(r) for some
r in R or (2) A ∈ Ka. Ad 1. Since there are no rules with
consequent n(r), n(r) ∈ AbA. Ad 2. By Lemma 4, there is
an a ∈ A⋆ = A with conc(a) = A. Hence, by the definition
of AbA, A ∈ AbA.
Lemma 7. Where A = A⋆ ⊆ Arg(AS,K), if A is admissi-
ble then AbA is admissible.
Proof. SupposeA = A⋆. By Lemma 6, AbA is closed. Sup-
pose AbA is not conflict-free. Hence, Kn ∪ AbA ⊢R A for
some A ∈ AbA. We use Lemma 4 according to which we
have two cases. Case 1: there is an a ∈ A⋆ s.t. conc(a) = A.
Since A = A⋆, a ∈ A and A is not conflict-free. Case 2:
A = n(r) and there is an a ∈ A for which conc(a) = B
where B is the consequent of r. Since n(r) ∈ AbA, there
is an argument a′ ∈ A which uses rule r to produce
conc(a′) = B and which is thus rebut-attacked by a. Again,
A is not conflict-free. Thus, we have shown (by contraposi-
tion) that if A is conflict-free then AbA is conflict-free.
Suppose A is admissible, ∆ is closed and attacks AbA.
Hence, Kn ∪ ∆ ⊢R A for some A ∈ AbA. By Lemma
4 we have two cases. Case 1: there is an a ∈ Arg∆ s.t.
conc(a) = A. Hence, A 6= n(r) for any r ∈ R. Clearly,
a attacks A. Since A is admissible, there is a b ∈ A s.t. b
attacks a. Then Abb ⊆ AbA and Kn ∪ Abb ⊢R conc(b).
Thus, Abb attacks Aba and hence AbA attacks ∆.
Case 2: A = n(r) and there is an a ∈ Arg∆ s.t.
conc(a) = B where B is the consequent of r. In this case
there is an a′ ∈ A which uses rule r and hence conc(a′) =
B. SinceA is admissible, there is a c ∈ A that attacks a. But
then ∆c ⊆ AbA attacks ∆a and hence AbA attacks ∆.
Lemma 8. If ∆ ⊆ Ab is admissible, then Arg∆ is admissi-
ble.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof.
Theorem 7. 1. If ∆ is preferred (resp. stable) then Arg∆ is
preferred (resp. stable).
2. If A is preferred (resp. stable) then ∆ is preferred (resp.
stable) for some ∆ ⊇ AbA for which Arg∆ = A.
Proof. Ad.1 Suppose ∆ is preferred. Then, by Lemma 8,
Arg∆ is admissible. Suppose there is an A′ ⊃ Arg∆ that
is admissible, then by Lemma 7, also AbA′ is admissible.
Since ∆ ⊂ AbA′ this is a contradiction.
Ad.2 SupposeA is preferred. By Lemma 5 and since triv-
ially A ⊆ A⋆, A = A⋆. By Lemma 7, AbA is admissible.
Now suppose that there is a ∆ ⊃ AbA that is admissible.
Then by Lemma 8, Arg∆ is admissible. ClearlyA ⊆ Arg∆.
By the maximality of A, A = Arg∆.
Due to space limitations we omit the proof for stable ex-
tensions.
Corollary 1 follows directly with Theorem 7, Lemma 4
and Fact 5.
8 Translating Assumption-based
Argumentation to Adaptive Logic
In this section we will translate a fragment of assumption-
based argumentation to adaptive logic.
In the following we write ABAAbR (Γ)for the assumption-
based framework ((L,R),Γ, Ab, ).
For our translation we will use some connectives from
Kleene’s well-known 3-valued logic K3 (see Table 1) and
superimpose them on a logic that is characterised by the
rules in R. This works as follows.
We define the 3-valued logic L3R semantically in the fol-
lowing way: we superimpose on the language L the oper-
ators ∼ and ∨ (which are supposed to not occur in the al-
phabet of L) resulting in the set of well-formed formulas
L3R. The operators are characterised by the truth tables in
Table 1.12
A A
1 0
0 1
u u
A ∼A
1 0
0 1
u 1
∨ 1 0 u
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 u
u 1 u u
Table 1: Truth-tables for , ∼ and ∨.
Definition 26. v : L → {0, 1, u} is a function which re-
spects the truth-table for (i.e., v(A) = 1 iff v(A) = 0,
v(A) = 0 iff v(A) = 1, and v(A) = u iff v(A) = u). The
valuation function vM : L3R → {0, u, 1} is defined induc-
tively as follows:
1. where A ∈ L, vM (A) = v(A)
2. vM (∼A) = 0 iff vM (A) = 1, and vM (∼A) = 1 else.
3. vM (A ∨B) = max(vM (A), vM (B)) where 0 < u < 1.
We write M |= A iff vM (A) = 1 (so 1 is the only designated
value). We writeL3
R
for the resulting consequence relation.
We now use L3R as a lower limit logic for an adaptive
logic with the set of abnormalties:
Notation 2. Ω∼Ab = {∼A | A ∈ Ab}.
We translate the rules of R as follows: A1, . . . , An → B
is translated to ∼A1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∼An ∨B.
Notation 3. Where R is a set of rules, we write R∼ for the
set of translated rules.
Our two main representational results in this section are
(to be proven below):
Theorem 8. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L, and sem = niv,
1. ABAAbR (Γ) ⊢∪sem A iff Γ ∪R∼ Ω
∼
Ab
,L3
R
ns A
2. ABAAbR (Γ) ⊢∩sem A iff Γ ∪R∼ Ω
∼
Ab
,L3R
ma A
3. ABAAbR (Γ) ⊢⋓sem A iff Γ ∪R∼ Ω
∼
Ab
,L3
R
r A
12In the terminology of [21], Our negation ∼ corresponds to
Bochvar’s ’external negation’ and corresponds to Kleene’s nega-
tion in his K3. Our disjunction ∨ is Kleene’s strong disjunction.
The requirement of supraclassicality for L3R to serve as a core logic
for an AL is satisfied in view of the 〈∨,∼〉-fragment of L3R.
We can strengthen our result if we suppose that the rule
system based on R satisfies the following requirement:
where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L,
EX Where∆ ⊆ Ab is naive in ABAAbR (Γ) andA ∈ Ab\∆,
Γ ∪∆ ⊢R A.
This criterion ensures that every naive set is stable.
Theorem 9. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L: if ABAAbR (Γ) satisfies
(EX), items 1–3 in Theorem 8 hold for sem ∈ {niv, prf, stb}.
We are now going to prove the two theorems above. The
following notation will be convenient to avoid clutter:
Notation 4. ∆∼ = {∼ A | A ∈ ∆}.
The following facts will be useful below:
Fact 6. Where Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {A} ⊆ L3R, (i) A L3R ∼A, (ii)
Γ L3
R
∨
∆∼ ∨A iff Γ ∪∆ L3
R
A.
L
3
R is obviously a compact Tarski logic.
We say that Γ ⊆ L is R-consistent iff there is no A such
that Γ ⊢R A,A.
Lemma 9. Where Γ ∪ {A} ⊆ L,
1. Γ ⊢R A implies Γ ∪R∼ L3
R
A
2. if Γ is R-consistent, Γ ∪R∼ L3
R
A implies Γ ⊢R A.
Proof. Ad 1. Simple induction on the number of proof steps.
We show the induction step. Let M be a model of Γ ∪ R∼.
Suppose A follows by means of the application of a rule
A1, . . . , An → B. By the induction hypothesis, M |=
A1, . . . , An. Also, M |= ∼A1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∼An ∨ B. Hence,
with the truth-tables for ∼ and ∨, M |= B.
Ad 2. Suppose Γ 0R A. We now construct a counter-
model M of Γ ∪R∼ for A as follows. Let
v : B 7→


1 Γ ⊢R B
0 Γ ⊢R B
u else
Note that v(A) ∈ {u, 0} and hence M 6|= A. We have to
show that M is a model of Γ∪R∼. Since Γ isR-consistent,
the definition warrants that the truth-table for is respected
by v. We thus only have to check whether M verifies all
formulas in Γ∪R∼. As for Γ this holds trivially since every
B ∈ Γ is such that Γ ⊢R B and thus v(B) = 1. Let now
A1, . . . , An → B ∈ R. We have to check whether M |=(∨n
i=1∼Ai
)
∨ B. Assume the opposite. Thus vM (Ai) = 1
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and vM (B) ∈ {0, u}. But then Γ ⊢R Ai
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and thus Γ ⊢R B. Hence, vM (B) = 1, a
contradiction.
We say that a Γ is L3R-consistent, if there is a A ∈ L3R for
which Γ 6L3
R
A.13
Lemma 10. Where Γ ⊆ L, if Γ isR-consistent then Γ∪R∼
is L3R-consistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ is R-consistent. Then Γ 0R A,A for any
A ∈ L. By Lemma 9, also Γ ∪ R∼ 1L3
R
A,A for any
A ∈ L.
13Or equivalently and analogous to the R-consistency: if there
is no A ∈ LL s.t. Γ 6L3
R
A,¬A.
Lemma 11. Where Γ ⊆ L: ∆∼ ⊆ Ω∼Ab \ φ for some φ ∈
ΦL3
R
(Γ ∪R∼), if ∆ is conflict-free in ABAAbR (Γ).
Proof. Suppose ∆∼ 6⊆ Ω∼Ab \ φ for all φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ ∪ R∼)
and ∆ ⊆ Ab. By Fact 1, Ω∼Ab \ ∆∼ is not a choice set of
ΣL3
R
(Γ ∪R∼) which means that there is a Θ∼ ∈ ΣL3
R
(Γ ∪
R∼) such that Θ ⊆ ∆. Since Γ∪R∼ L3
R
∨
Θ∼, by Fact 6
also Γ ∪ (Θ \ {A}) ∪R∼ L3
R
∼A for any A ∈ Θ. Hence,
Γ ∪∆ ∪ R∼ is not L3R-consistent since Γ ∪∆ ∪ R∼ L3R
A,∼A. Thus by Lemma 10, Γ ∪∆ is not R-consistent and
thus ∆ is not conflict-free.
Lemma 12. Where Γ ⊆ L, ∆∼ = Ω∼Ab \ φ for some φ ∈
ΦL3
R
(Γ ∪R∼), ∆ is naive in ABAAbR (Γ).
Proof. Suppose∆∼ = Ω∼Ab\φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ∪R∼).
We first prove that ∆ is conflict-free. Suppose for a con-
tradiction, there is a B ∈ Ab such that Γ ∪∆ ⊢R B,B. By
Lemma 9, Γ∪∆∪R∼ L3
R
B,B. Hence, Γ∪∆∪R∼ is L3R-
inconsistent and by Fact 6 and compactness, Γ ∪ R∼ L3
R∨
Θ∼ for some finite Θ ⊆ ∆. Let Θ be⊂-minimal with this
property, so that Θ∼ ∈ ΣL3
R
(Γ ∪ R∼). Since φ ∩ Θ∼ = ∅
this is a contradiction to the fact that φ ∈ ΦL3
R
(Γ ∪R∼).
We now show that∆ is closed. Assume for a contradiction
that Γ ∪ ∆ ⊢R A for some A ∈ Ab \ ∆. By Lemma 9,
Γ∪∆∪R∼ L3
R
A. Note that∼A ∈ φ. By Fact 1, there is
a Θ∼ ∈ ΣL3
R
(Γ ∪ R∼) for which {∼A} = φ ∩ Θ∼. Since
Γ∪R∼ L3
R
∨
Θ∼, by Fact 6, Γ∪R∼∪Θ\{A} L3
R
∼A.
By the monotonicity of L3R, Γ ∪ R∼ ∪∆ L3R ∼A. Thus,
Γ∪∆∪R∼ is not L3R-consistent which implies by Lemma
10 that Γ ∪∆ is not R-consistent. This contradicts the fact
that ∆ is conflict-free.
The following theorem follows immediately in view of
Lemma 11 and Lemma 12:
Theorem 10. Where Γ ⊆ L, ∆ is a naive extension of
ABA
Ab
R (Γ) iff ∆∼ = Ω∼Ab \φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ∪R∼).
If we suppose requirement (EX), we can also prove The-
orem 9.
Lemma 13. Where Γ ⊆ L, R satisfies (EX), and ∆∼ =
Ω∼Ab \ φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ ∪ R∼), ∆ is stable in
ABA
Ab
R (Γ).
Proof. Suppose∆∼ = Ω∼Ab\φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ∪R∼).
In view of Lemma 12 we only need to show that ∆ attacks
allB ∈ Ab\∆. Let thusB ∈ Ab\∆. By (EX),Γ∪∆ ⊢R B.
Thus, ∆ attacks B.
The following Corollary follows immediately in view of
Theorem 10 and Lemma 13.
Corollary 2. WhereR satisfies (EX), each naive set is stable
in ABAAbR (Γ).
In [7], the following was defined resp. proven:
Definition 27. An assumption-based framework is normal
iff every naive set of assumptions is stable.
Theorem 11. For any normal assumption-based frame-
work, for any set of assumptions ∆ ⊆ Ab, ∆ is naive iff
∆ is stable iff ∆ is preferred.
Corollary 3. If an assumption-based framework satisfies
(EX), Γ ⊆ L, ∆ is a preferred, stable and naive extension of
ABA
Ab
R (Γ) iff ∆∼ = Ω∼Ab \φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ∪R∼).
We are now in a position to prove our two main theorems
in this section.
Proof of Theorems 8 and 9. [Theorem 9.1, ⇐]: Sup-
pose that Γ ∪ R∼ Ω
∼
Ab
,L3R
ns A. By Theorem 3, there
is a ∆∼ ⊆ Ω∼Ab \ φ for some φ ∈ ΦL3R(Γ ∪ R
∼) s.t.
Γ ∪ R∼ L3
R
A ∨
∨
∆∼. By the monotonicity of L3R and
Fact 6, Θ ∪ Γ ∪ R∼ L3
R
A where Θ∼ = Ω∼Ab \ φ. By
Lemma 13, Θ is stable. Thus, Γ ∪ Θ is R-consistent. By
Lemma 9, ABAAbR (Γ) ⊢∪sem A.
The other direction and the other cases are shown analo-
gously.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we provided translations between several
prominent systems in nonmonotonic logic (see Fig. 1 for an
overview). In this conclusion we discuss some benefits.
In view of the translation of ALs into ABA we know that
ALs can be understood as forms of formal argumentation.
In view of the fact that ALs are equi-expressive with the
syntactically characterised preferential semantics in Sec. 3
and Makinson’s default assumptions, the same can be said
about the latter two frameworks. Since a broad variety of
defeasible reasoning forms in a wide range of application
contexts have been explicated within the ALs family (see
Sec. 2), all these reasoning forms are now available in the
domain of formal argumentation. This may lead to further
refinements. For instance, once embedded in ASPIC+ we
gain rich resources to express preferences and priorities.
In view of the other direction, from a subclass of ABA to
ALs, we know that this class can be understood in terms of
the model-theoretic tools provided by KLM-style preferen-
tial semantics or, alternatively, as consistency management
in terms of maximal consistent subsets as provided by de-
fault assumptions. This also means that meta-theoretic in-
sights from, for instance, ALs become available for this sub-
class of ABA. For example, the computational complexity
of ALs is well-understood [23, 15]. Moreover, properties of
the AL consequence relations apply to this class of ABA.
For instance, we know that adaptive consequence relations
are cumulative (in the notation of Section 2, where AL is an
adaptive logic, Γ,∆, {A} ⊆ L, and Γ ⊢AL B for all B ∈ ∆,
Γ ⊢AL A iff Γ ∪ ∆ ⊢AL A). For a study of meta-theoretic
properties of ALs see [4, 19]. Finally, besides the available
dialogue-based methods to model argumentative reasoning
processes (e.g. [9]), now the dynamic proof theory of adap-
tive logics can also be used for this purpose.
Finally, we complete the circle between ABA and
ASPIC+ (without priorities/preferences) by providing a
translation from the latter to the former, whereas the other
direction has been presented in [16]. As a side-product this
provides a way to phrase the defeasible rules of ASPIC+
as strict rules. This shows that the strict fragment of
ASPIC+ (without strict rules and thus without rebuttals
and undercuts) is equi-expressive with full ASPIC+. Such
insights are conceptually interesting and may simplify
future meta-theoretic investigations into ASPIC+.
In future work we intend to generalise our investigations
to approaches with priorities and preferences as provided in
ASPIC+ and some generalisations of ALs. An interesting
question will be, for instance, whether full ASPIC+ is trans-
latable into lexicographic ALs [19, ch.5] or whether the lat-
ter can be translated to ABA or ASPIC+.
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